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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY,
a Maryland corporation,
Pwintiff and Appellant,
vs.

GENERAL CONTRACTING CORP.,
a Utah corporation; FEDERAL
INSURANCE CO., a corporation; and
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a New Jersey corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

No. 10326

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants' (respondents' ) Brief under Point I raised
an issue which was not discussed in plaintiff's (appellant's)
brief. In order to properly discuss and argue this issue,
it is necessary that certain facts concerning the handling
of the case in the trial court be set forth. The parties are
referred to herein by the same designations as used in
Appellant's Brief. This case was argued on two occasions
in the district court.
1

On October 20, 1964, the case was argued before
District Judge Marcellus K. Snow on defendants' motion to
dismiss. Arguments by each side were b1ief but in its
argument opposing the motion, plaintiff, now appellant,
argued two main points, first its claim on the bond required
by the Contractors' Bonding Statute, and second its claim
based on common law contract principles, specifically that
plaintiff was a third party beneficiary under the construction contract between defendant, U. S. Steel and the State
of Utah. The court denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 20, 1965 at a special setting before Judge
Stewart M. Hanson on cross motions for summary judgment,
the case was argued at length. On that occasion, counsel
for plaintiff devoted about half his argument to the common law contract claim (third party beneficiary) and cited
cases and authorities in support thereof, including Smith
vs. Bowman, 32 Utah 33-39, 88 P 687 and State vs. Campbell Building Co., (Utah 1938) 77 P 2d 341. Defendants'
counsel responded to this argument arguing among other
things that the bonding statute was plaintiff's exclusive
remedy. On both occasions, defendants were represented
by the same counsel who prepared Respondents' Brief.
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S COMMON LAW CONTRACT
CLAIM, THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A THIRD
PARTY BENEFICIARY UNDER THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, WAS CONTAINED
IN THE PLEADINGS AND WAS RAISED IN
THE TRIAL COURT.
Point I in defendants' (respondents') brief raises a
new issue not considered in plaintiff's (appellant's) Brief.
2
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lt is asserted in the title of said Point I that "The Third
Party Beneficiary Theory . . . Was Neither Raised Nor
Preserved In The Record On Appeal. ... "
Plaintiff's Complaint, R. 1, 2 and 3, contains allegations of facts sufficient to constitute a claim in common
law contract. Furthermore, as set forth in the Supplemental Statement of Facts, on two occasions in the trial comt,
the issues of the case were argued and on each occasion,
defendants' counsel being present, plaintiff argued the common law contract claim and theorv.
,
An anlysis of the complaint reveals that it alleges
facts sufficient to state both claims, the one on the bond
and bond statute and the other on the contract. The Complaint contains the following essential allegations of fact:
That the defendant, contractor, U. S. Steel, entered into
a contract with the State Road Commission of Utah whereby
U. S. Steel agreed to furnish the labor, equipment and
materials necessary to perform work in the construction
of one steel arch bridge; (a copy of the contract is attached
to the Complaint, marked EXHIBIT "A" and by reference
made a part thereof); that the Subcontractor was a subcontractor of U. S. Steel, and, in the prosecution of the
work required under the contract ordered and received
materials from plaintiff which were used in the prosecution
of the work; and that said materials were of a certain value
and payment had not been received therefor. (A copy of
the bond, EXHIBIT "B" was also attached to the Complaint and made a part thereof. ) Then follows paragraph 9
of the Complaint which alleges: "Pursuant to EXHIBITS
"A" and "B," the defendants Contractor and Surety also
owe plaintiff $3,773.00." (Emphasis added) Nowhere in
the Complaint is it alleged that the only claim or cause
of action is on the bond. The Complaint alleges more than
3

would be necessary if the only claim intended had been
on the bond. If the claim on the bond was all that had
been intended, paragraph 9 of the Complaint would be
surplusage. The inclusion of the term "also" in paragraph 9
is noted, indicating that in addition to other claims plaintiff
also asserted its claim under the contract.
Defendants point out in their brief that plaintiff filed
no memorandum in the trial court. This is bue but the
filing of a written argument or memorandum is not a pre·
requisite to the preservation of a claim or theory on appeal.
Plaintiff's common law contract claim was adequately set
forth in the Complaint.
Defendants assert that plaintiff's Complaint contains
only one count. The Complaint, R. 1, 2, and 3, contains
12 paragraphs and a prayer. It is not subdivided by counts.
The rules do not require that separate causes of action
be stated in separate counts.
The party may set forth two or more statements of
a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically,
either in one count or defense or in separate counts
or defenses.
Rule 8 ( e) ( 2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
One of the prime purposes of modem code pleading,
specifically the new rules as adopted in Utah, was to sim·
plify the technical requirements of pleadings; to provide
that facts rather than law be plead. It is not essential
that a pleader specify the theories.
Judge Charles E. Clark speaking on this point has said.

If the plaintiff is to be expected to state only the
past occurrences between the parties, and the court
is then to grant him such relief as those occurrenc~s
justify, it should be immaterial that he called his
4

action one of tort, whereas the court thought it was
one of contract, or one in "equity," whereas the court
thought it one "at law." This has been ruled many
times by able courts .... Therefore, he should not be
forced to fulfill any requirement of having and maintaining a single legal theory of his pleadings; he
should be held only to the ideal of reasonably fair
notice of the facts of his case.
Clark on Code Pleading,
Second Edition, p. 261.
Defendants' main theme seems to be that plaintiff failed
to raise its "contract theory" in the lower court and preserve
it in the record. Under the rules it is not the theory that
must be plead but rather facts sufficient to state a claim.
The rule on this point is well stated in one of the texts.
Under modern practice, where the test of sufficiency
of plaintiff's initial pleading is whether, if the facts
therein alleged are admited or proved, he is entitled
to recover against defendant . . . and under which
practice if plaintiff is entitled to some relief under
the facts which he has set forth he will be granted
such relief, although it differs from the relief for
which he prayed . . . it has been considered that
plaintiff is not obligated to forecast with absolute
accuracy the theory of either the law or the facts
on which he will relv at the trial, and that while
good practice calls f ~r a definite theory, the mere
absence of such a theory is not of itself fatal to a
complaint.

The statement continues:
Moreover, the fact that the complaint is drawn on an
erroneous theory will not prove fatal where it alleges
facts sufficient to support the judgment. Accordingly,
it is frequently held that, if the complaint states a
cause of action on any theory, it is sufficient, that the
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facts alleged need not be such as to entitle plaintiff
to recover under any particular form of action, and
that the petition need not be invulnerable as against
a motion to make more definite and certain.
The statement then concludes:

If a complaint sets up two theories of recovery, and
the major theory fails, plaintiff may avail himself of
the minor theory if this works no injustice to his opponent, and, if a plaintiff adopts a wrong theory and
fails to prove the cause of action intended, where he
proves any other cause of action embraced by the
allegations in his pleading, he may recover on that.
71 C.J.S. 228, 229, Pleading,
Section 92. To the same effect see also
41 Am. Jur. 347, Pleading, Section 81.
The intent of the drafters of the new rules that they
should serve the ends of justice and not deny justice by
technicalities is particularly indicated in certain of the
rules. Rule 54 ( c) ( 1 ) provides:
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.
See also "Some of the Purposes and Effects of the New
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure," 2 Utah Law Review 21.
In a recent Utah case decided by this Court where the
court considered generally the question of pleading a proper
theory, it said:

"Sec. 104-1-2, U.C.R. 1943 provides:
There is in this state but one fom1 of civil action
for the enforcement or protection of private right:,
and the redress or prevention of private wrongs.
6

Under this section this court has held that a pleader
is not required to follow any particular form or
special theory in stating tl1e facts, and if the facts
stated entitled plaintiff to any relief under the substantive law, then he has stated what is termed "a
good cause of action," and the court must enter judgment in his favor so far as any attack upon the sufficiency of the pleading is concerned.
Hanson vs. Openshaw, (Utah 1945)
155 P. 2d 410.
In a suit between partners to establish a partnership
and to recover for partnership property allegedly diverted
by defendants, this court had under consideration the sufficiency of an amended complaint and the question arose
as to whether the complaint embraced two causes of action,
one to declare the existence of a partnership and for an
accounting and the other sounding in fraud, the court noted:
It is not necessary to designate the type of action.
The code only requires a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action in ordinary and concise
language.

Further on in the decision the Court continues:
It is not required that a series of transactions so
closely related in time and fact as to produce a
substantial cause and effect transition be grouped
and compartmentalized so as to fall into designated
types of legal actions. The law serves life. Reformed
pleading unlike that of common law is not a straight
jacket which allows no freedom of movement. Life
and the books are replete with cases where the alleged wrong emanates or evolves from a series of
related transactions in which various actors have
played varying parts with varying degrees of guilt
or delict. The wrong chosen from the whole of the
facts as a basis for the action is nonetheless so because a separation and grouping of some of the
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transactions along the way may disclose other lesser
or incidental wrongs which could themselves have
been made the basis of causes of action of a conventional type.
Graham vs. Street (Utah 1946)
166 P. 2d 524

See also California Land & Construction Co. vs. Halloran
(Utah 1932) 17 P. 2d 209
Defendants rely heavily on Dix Lumber Company vs.
City of Boston, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N.E. 117, asserting that
the precise question now before this court was before the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in that case.
We submit that the precise question before the court now
was not considered by the Massachusetts court in that
case. The holding there differs in several respects. The
primary question was whether materials furnished by the
Plaintiff on a public construction project had been "used
or employed" as those terms were used in the statute. The
decision was that since none of the materials were incorporated in the finished structures or were entirely destroyed
in prosecuting the work, the materialmen could not recover.
That case differs from this case in the following respects:
( 1) There a new argument was raised for the first
time in oral argument before the appellate court. Here,
all arguments now being made were made before the trial
court. ( 2) There, the Appellants contended that even
though they could not recover under the terms of the statutory bond, they should be entitled to recover on a common
law bond theory. Here, plaintiff is not contending to re·
cover on a common law bond theory as to the surety; rather
it is contending to recover under the contract of the general
contractor on a common law contract theory. (3) There,
Appellant had sought recovery solely on the bond. Here,
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plaintiff seeks recovery on one claim on the bond and on
the second claim on the contract.
The case of Pettingill r:s. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272
P 2d 185 cited and quoted from by Defendants is foreign
both to the issues and circumstances of this case. In that
case, a suit by a father against a motorist for injuries to
his son, the trial court at the Plaintiff's request gave instructions covering the contributory negligence of the mother.
On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that the negligence of the
mother, if any, was immaterial. The main point of the
decision is contained in the following statement in the
decision immediately preceding the statement quoted on
page 8 of Respondent's Brief:
Furthermore, it is well established that a party cannot assign as error the giving of his own requests.
He cannot lead the court into error and then be
heard to complaint thereof.
The rule cited in Defendants' Brief from the North
Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water and Irr. Co. case, 118 Utah
600, 223 P 2d 577, is not applicable because here, unlike
the circumstance there, the issues were initially raised in
the court below.
Defendants argue that plaintiff has shifted its theory
on appeal. Plaintiff's claims, causes of action, theories, etc.,
have always been present in the case, as set forth in the
facts alleged in the Complaint and such claims or theories
were argued with Defendants on two occasions in the trial
court. Even if there were merit to Defendants' argument,
as the foregoing authorities conclude, a party may rely on
whatever theory or claim may be supported by the facts
alleged in the Complaint.
9

POINT II
THE CONTRACTORS' BOND STATUTE IS
NOT EXCLUSIVE AND HAS NO RESTRICTIVE
EFFECT AS TO A CLAIM BY A MATERIALMAN AGAINST A CONTRACTOR ON THE
LATTER'S CONTRACT.
Plaintiff acknowledges that the bond here involved
was furnished pursuant to the requirements of the Contractors' Bond Statute, Chapter 1 of Title 14, (either the
old statute, Sections 14-1-1 through 14-1-4, or the new statute, Sections 14-1-5 through 14-1-9). Plaintiff further acknowledges that the requirements of the statute are applicable as to claims on the bond. However, under the circumstances of this case, plaintiff has, and has asserted two
claims, one on the bond and the other on the contract;
the latter to pursue its rights as a third party beneficiary
under such contract.
A prime purpose of the Utah Contractors' Bond Statute, Chapter 1, Title 14 was to protect materialmen in circumstances where the contractor and subcontractor became
defunct or insolvent. C'.lmpbell Building Co. vs. District
Court of Millard County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P 2d 255. The
statute required the furnishing of a bond and provided
that if the bond were not furnished the materialman could
bring an action against the public body. The statute contained a statute of limitations and certain procedural requirements which plaintiff acknowledges must be recognized
in pursuing a claim on the bond. Defendants, however,
appear to ignore the right that a materialman has to proceed against the contractor independently of the bond.
Although the enactment of the Contractors' Bond Statute,
Chapter 1 of Title 14, afforded a materialman additional
protection by making available to him the payment bond,
10

the statute was not intended to deprive the materialman of
ordinary contract rights that he might otherwise have against
the contractor.
The enactment of the Contractors' Bond Statute, afforded the materialman an extra remedy - an action on the
bond against the surety and contractor. Without the statute
a materialsman normally had a contract action against the
contractors for supplying and furnishing labor and materials.
The Contractors' Bond Statute did not destroy this right
of action. The statute requires the bond - it does not require the contract. The bond exists apart from the contract
and the contract apart from the bond and although one
may refer to the other; different rights and obligations are
created by each. See Nash Engineering Co. v. Marcy Realty
Corporation, (Ind. 1944) 54 N.E. 2d 263. In suits on the
bond, the limitations and requirements stated in the statute
are applicable. Such statutory limitations and requirements
have no application with respect to suits against the contractor on the contract.
The essential circumstances of this case which are
relevant to thi~ Point are as follows: The contractor, respondent, U. S. Steel, entered into a written contract with
the State of Utah agreeing to construct a steel bridge and
furnish all materials and supplies therefor. (The bonding
statute did not require this contract.) By the terms of this
contract, certain other documents including the bond were
specifically made a part of the contract. One provision of
the bond provides that the contractor shall pay all materialmen, including materialmen of subcontractors. U. S. Steel
engaged the subcontractor to perform certain work on the
bridge and at the subcontractor's request plaintiff furnished
materials which were used on the project. Under the clear
language of the contract and on ordinary principles of
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contract law plaintiff was a third party beneficiary entitled
to recover from U. S. Steel for the value of the materials
supplied.
Defendants fail to distinguish between plaintiff's claim
against the contractor on the contract and plaintiff's claim
against the surety and the contractor on the bond. As
heretofore stated, the contract between U. S. Steel and the
State of Utah was not required by the bonding statute and
rights and obligations which arose out of this contract must
be determined by looking to the provisions of the contract
itself and principles of contract law. The requirements of
the statute in no way affect the rights and obligations
created under the contract.
It is significant to note that although plaintiff, in pur·
suing its contract claim, relies on certain language in the
bond, such language is relied on only as it constitutes a
part of the contract. As heretofore stated, the contract
expressly provided that the bond become a part of the
conract. The bond itself is not relied on as an instrument
creating liability. It is the contract which creates in plain·
tiff its rights as a third party beneficiary and certain provisions of the bond are applicable as they constitute a part
of the contract.

Plaintiff has no serious dispute with the cases cited
by Defendants under Point II of their Brief. The essential
holding in those cases is that where a materialman files
suit on a bond given pursuant to the requirements of a
statute the bond must be construed together with the
statute, and the remedies afforded by the statute are ex·
elusive, so far as a cwim on the bond is concerned. (Em·
phasis added) But those cases are not applicable. Here
we are considering plaintiff's claim on the contract. Those
cases do not hold that the bonding statutes restrict or
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preclude contract actions by materialmen against the contractor based on the construction contract.
On page 14 of their Brief, Defendants cite and rely
upon General Electric Supp. Corp. v. Willey Electric Co.,
47 Ohio App. 196, 191 N.E. 706. The court there held that
the statutory remedy was exclusive as to the surety company, but the case makes no reference as to any claim
against the contractor. It is probable, as is the situation
in most of such suits, that the contractor was either defunct
or insolvent. Nowhere in the case is there reference to a
claim by the materialman against the contractor on the
basis of contract, as is the situation here, and that case
does not hold that the remedy provided in the bonding
statute is exclusive so as to prevent a claim against the
contractor on contract.
Defendants argue in their Brief that plaintiff "seeks to
appropriate unto itself the benefits of the statute without
being bound by the necessary and incidental statutory obligations." This is not so. Plaintiff acknowledges that on its
claim on the bond the requirements and obligations of the
statute apply. However, plaintiff's claim on the contract
is entirely apart from the statute and therefore the statutory
requirements do not apply.
We have heretofore, under Point I, discussed the case

of Dix Lumber Company vs. Boston, Supra, pointing out
that the ruling in that case is inapplicable to the circumstances of this case.
In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. vs. Southern
Surety Co., 59 S.W. 2d 291, (Tex. Civ. App. 1933 ), cited
on page 15 of Respondents' Brief, the Texas court held that
even though the bond created common law obligations independent of the statutes, since the bond was given pur-
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suant to the requirements of the statute, the bond must be
construed in connection therewith and the remedies afforded
by the statute were exclusive. The court therefore held that
any common law rights created by the bond were not enforceable. Plaintiff is not here pursuing common law bond
obligations. It is rather pursuing common law contract
obligations arising out of U. S. Steel's contract.
Defendants' cited cases may have application to plaintiff's claim on the bond against the surety and the contractor but those cases do not apply to plaintiff's claim against
the contractor on the contract.
The issue presented in this case seldom arises because
in most situations, the contractor and the subcontractor are
not involved in the suit, they being insolvent.
Plaintiff submits that State vs. Campbell Building Co.,
94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341, cited in both plaintiff's and
defendants' briefs, contains a clear statement of the law
supporting plaintiff's position; that aside from rights on the
bond the materialman has a separate claim against the
contractor not restricted by the statute. The case is discussed on page 10 of plaintiff's brief and on page 18 of defendants' brief. Defendants misconstrue the meaning of
the statement from the case quoted and italicized in their
brief at the bottom of page 18, particularly the following:
"It is only when it is sought to hold the surety only when recovery is to be made under the hon~
- that the provisions of the statute come into play.

A proper interpretation of this statement means simply that
the provisions of the statute come into play when a claim
is made on the bond. It certainly does not mean that the
provisions of the statute come into play so as to restrict or
preclude a separate claim made on the contract.

14

Respondents contend that appellant is not a creditor
of the contractor, U. S. Steel. It is submitted that appellant is a creditor of said contractor. It is a creditor by
virtue of the terms of U. S. Steel's contract with the State
of Uah. By the terms thereof, plaintiff became a third party
beneficiary on the basis of established principles of contract
law. The rule is well stated in Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 4,
Section 779 L pages 60, 61, quoted on pages 9 and 10 of
plaintiff's (appellant's) brief. (See also Nash Engineering
Co. v. Marcy Realty Corporation, supra.)

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed
and judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff against U. S.
Steel on the basis of plaintiff's contractual rights under
the construction contract bond.
Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM and
GARY L. THEURER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
428 American Oil Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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